



MatrixSSL Developer's Guide

Version 3.6

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1 OVERVIEW

This developer's guide is a general SSL/TLS overview and a MatrixSSL specific integration reference for adding SSL security into an application.

This document is primarily intended for the software developer performing MatrixSSL integration into their custom application but is also a useful reference for anybody wishing to learn more about MatrixSSL or the SSL/TLS protocol in general.

For additional information on the APIs discussed here please see the [MatrixSSL API](#) document included in this package.

1.1 Nomenclature

MatrixSSL supports both the TLS and SSL protocols. Despite the difference in acronym, TLS 1.0 is simply version 3.1 of SSL. There are no practical security differences between the protocols, and only minor differences in how they are implemented. It was felt that 'Transport Layer Security' was a more appropriate name than 'Secure Sockets Layer' going forward beyond SSL 3.0. In this documentation, the term SSL is used generically to mean SSL/TLS, and TLS is used to indicate specifically the TLS protocol. SSL 2.0 is deprecated and not supported. MatrixSSL supports SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 protocols. In addition, the DTLS protocol is based closely on TLS 1.1 and beyond.

2 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Prior to working directly with the MatrixSSL library there are some critical SSL security concepts that application integrators should be familiar with.

2.1 SSL/TLS Version Security

Although SSL 3.0 and above can be considered secure, several weaknesses have been discovered in some versions and cipher combinations.

All of the issues discovered are mitigated by default in MatrixSSL. Additionally, SSL 3.0 is disabled by default in MatrixSSL to reduce version downgrade attacks.

Vulnerability	SSL 3.0	TLS 1.0	TLS 1.1	TLS 1.2	Fixed	Solution
BEAST	Vuln	Vuln	Ok	Ok	Yes	USE_BEAST_WORKAROUND enabled by default http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#BEAST_attack Some implementations of TLS are not compatible with this workaround.
CRIME	Vuln	Vuln	Vuln	Vuln	Yes	USE_ZLIB_COMPRESSION disabled by default http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CRIME_(security_exploit)
BREACH	Vuln	Vuln	Vuln	Vuln	Yes	Application code should not compress frequently used headers http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BREACH_(security_exploit)
LUCKY13 Padding Attacks	Vuln	Vuln	Vuln	Vuln	Yes	Internal blinding for block cipher padding automatically applied http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucky_Thirteen_attack Applies to block ciphers only.
Renegotiation Attacks	Vuln	Vuln	Vuln	Vuln	Yes	REQUIRE_SECURE_REHANDSHAKES enabled by default http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Renegotiation_at_tack Some implementations of TLS are not compatible with this extension
Version rollback attacks	Vuln	Vuln	Vuln	Vuln	Yes	ENABLE_FALSE_START disabled by default http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Version_rollback_attacks
RC4 Weakness	Vuln	Less Vuln	Less Vuln	Less Vuln	Yes	USE_SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_* disabled by default Internal code limitations for the number of bytes RC4 will encode http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#RC4_attacks SSL 3.0 is more vulnerable because RC4 is more commonly used
3DES Weakness	Vuln	Less Vuln	Less Vuln	Less Vuln	Yes	USE_SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA disabled by default http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#RC4_attacks SSL 3.0 is more vulnerable because 3DES is more commonly used
MD5 MAC Weakness	Vuln	Less Vuln	Less Vuln	Less Vuln	Yes	USE_SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 disabled by default All other MD5 based ciphers disabled by default
MD5 Cert Weakness	Vuln	Less Vuln	Less Vuln	Less Vuln	Yes	ENABLE_MD5_SIGNED_CERTS disabled by default
MD5 MAC Weakness	Vuln	Less Vuln	Less Vuln	Less Vuln	Yes	USE_SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 disabled by default All other MD5 based ciphers disabled by default

2.2 Selecting Cipher Suites

The strength of the secure communications is primarily determined by the choice of cipher suites that will be supported. A cipher suite determines how two peers progress through an SSL handshake as well as how the final application data will be encrypted over the secure connection. The four components of any given cipher suite are key exchange, authentication, encryption and digest hash.

Key exchange mechanisms refer to how the peers agree upon a common symmetric key that will be used to encrypt data after handshaking is complete. The two common key exchange algorithms are RSA and Diffie-Hellman (DH or ECDH). Currently, when Diffie-Hellman is chosen it is used almost exclusively in ephemeral mode (DHE or ECDHE) in which new private key pairs are generated for each connection to

allow perfect forward secrecy. The trade-off for DHE is a much slower SSL handshake as key generation is a relatively processor-intensive operation. Some older protocols also specify DH, as it was the first widely publicized key exchange algorithm. The elliptic curve variations on the Diffie-Hellman algorithms are denoted ECDH or ECDHE in the cipher suite name.

Authentication algorithms specify how the peers will prove their identities to each other. Authentication options within cipher suites are RSA, DSA, Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA), Pre-shared Key (PSK), or anonymous if no authentication is required. RSA has the unique property that it can be used for both key exchange and authentication. For this reason, RSA has become the most widely implemented cipher suite mechanism for SSL communications. RSA key strengths of between 1024 and 2048 bits are the most common.

The encryption component of the cipher suite identifies which symmetric cipher is to be used when exchanging data at the completion of the handshake. The AES block cipher is recommended for new implementations, and is the most likely to have hardware acceleration support.

Finally, the digest hash is the choice of checksum algorithm used to confirm the integrity of exchanged data, with SHA-1 being the most common and SHA256 recommended for new implementations. Here is a selection of cipher suites that illustrate how to identify the four components.

Cipher Suite	Key Exchange	Auth Type	Encryption	Digest Hash
SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	RSA	RSA	3DES	SHA-1
SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5	DH	Anonymous	RC4-128	MD5
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	RSA	RSA	AES-128	SHA-1
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DHE	RSA	AES-256	SHA-1
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	ECDHE	RSA	AES-128	SHA-1
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	ECDHE	ECDSA	AES-256	SHA-1
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	ECDH	ECDSA	AES-128	SHA-256

The AES_GCM cipher combines the encryption and digest hash components into a single algorithm so a dedicated hash algorithm is not used in these suites.

Symmetric Algorithms Supported by MatrixSSL

Algorithm	Recommended?	Typical Risks
RC4	No	Several known weaknesses. Can be OK for small amounts of data.
3DES	No	Theoretical weaknesses. AES typically a better candidate.
SEED	No	Standard usage only in Korea. AES is a better candidate.
AES	Yes	AES-256 preferred over AES-192 and AES-128. Lucky13 Attack mitigated internally.
AES-GCM	Yes	AES-256 preferred over AES-192 and AES-128. Lucky13 Attack mitigated internally. Without hardware acceleration, can be slower than AES-SHA. Risk that an as-yet undiscovered AES attack will compromise both encryption and record validation.

Hash Algorithms Supported by MatrixSSL

Algorithm	Recommended?	Typical Risks
MD2	No	Known weak. Used only for legacy certificate signatures. USE_MD2 disabled by default.
MD4	No	Known weak. Used only for legacy certificate signatures. USE_MD4 disabled by default.
MD5	No	Proven attacks. SSL 3.0 through TLS 1.1 require MD5 in combination with SHA-1 for their internal protocol (and therefore are at least as strong as SHA-1). TLS 1.2 does not require MD5. All MD5 based cipher suites disabled by default. ENABLE_MD5_SIGNED_CERTS disabled by default.

SHA-1	Yes	SHA-1 is widely deployed despite recent collision attacks. Only TLS 1.2 and newly issued certificates using SHA-2 are able to remove SHA-1 completely from the TLS protocol.
SHA-256	Yes	Assumed secure.
SHA-384	Yes	Assumed secure.
SHA-512	Yes	Assumed secure.

Key Exchange Algorithms Supported by MatrixSSL

Algorithm	Key Size	Recommended?	Typical Risks
RSA	< 1024	No	Weak. Below MIN_RSA_SIZE connections will be refused.
RSA	1024	No	In wide usage. Recommended to not use going forward
RSA	> 1024	Yes	Recommend at least 2048 bit keys.
DH	< 1024	No	Weak. Below MIN_DH_SIZE connections will be refused.
DH	1024	No	In wide usage. Recommended to not use going forward
DH	> 1024	Yes	Recommend at least 2048 bit DH group.
DHE/ECDHE	1024 / 192	Yes	See chart below. Ephemeral cipher suites provide perfect forward secrecy, and are generally the strongest available, although they are also the slowest performing for key exchange.
ECC	>= 192	Yes	192 bit DH group and above is currently assumed secure. Smaller groups are not supported in MatrixSSL. Below MIN_ECC_SIZE connections will be refused.
PSK	>= 128	Yes*	Pre-shared Key ciphers rely on offline key agreement. *They avoid any weaknesses of Key Exchange Algorithms, however, it is not easy to change keys once they are installed when used as session keys. When PSK is used only for authentication (DHE_PSK cipher suites), the session encryption keys are generated each connection.

Authentication Methods Supported by MatrixSSL

Suite Type	Auth	Exchange	Recommended?	Typical Risks
RSA_WITH_NULL	RSA	-	No	No encryption. Authentication via RSA. Typically used for debugging connections only (since
DH_anon	-	Diffie-Hellman	Yes*	No Authentication. Key exchange only. *If used, authentication MUST be done by direct comparison of remote DH key ID to trusted key ID, similar to SSH authentication. If DH key ID authentication is done, this is similar in strength to DHE_PSK ciphers, although the keys exchanged are not ephemeral. Authentication to a trusted key ID can mitigate many attacks related to X.509 PKI infrastructure.
PSK	Pre-shared Key	Pre-shared Key	Yes	Pre-shared Keys can be used for authentication, since the same secret must be shared between client and server. DHE_PSK suites use PSK only for authentication, while PSK_suites use PSK for authentication and session keys. PSK keys are difficult to change in the field, however authentication with PSK can mitigate many attacks related to X.509 PKI infrastructure.
RSA	RSA	RSA	Yes	The most commonly used authentication method. Supported by X.509 PKI infrastructure. Additional security can be had by directly comparing RSA key IDs to trusted Key Ids (similar to Certificate Pinning). Usually faster than ECC based authentication.
DHE_RSA	RSA	Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral	Yes	RSA for authentication, Ephemeral DH for key exchange. Provides Perfect forward secrecy. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secretcy

DHE_PSK	PSK	Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral	Yes	PSK for authentication, Ephemeral DH for key exchange. Does not rely on X.509.
ECDH_ECDSA	ECC DSA	ECC Diffie-Hellman	Yes	ECC DSA for authentication, ECC for key exchange. Most commonly used in embedded devices supporting hardware based ECC support.
ECDH_RSA	RSA	ECC Diffie-Hellman	Yes	ECC key exchange, with RSA authentication. Uses widely deployed X.509 RSA certificate infrastructure, but ECC for key exchange. Not often deployed due to the implementation having to support ECC and RSA.
ECDHE_ECDSA	ECC DSA	ECC Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral	Yes	ECC key exchange with ephemeral keys, ECC DSA authentication. Most commonly used in embedded devices supporting hardware based ECC support.
ECDHE_RSA	RSA	ECC Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral	Yes	Ephemeral counterpart to ECDH_RSA.

2.3 Authentication Mode

By default in SSL, it is the server that is authenticated by a client. It is easiest to remember this when thinking about purchasing a product online with a credit card over an HTTPS (SSL) connection. The client Web browser must authenticate the server in order to be confident the credit card information is being sent to a trusted source. This is referred to as one-way authentication or server authentication and is performed as part of all standard SSL connections (unless, of course, a cipher suite with an authentication type of anonymous has been agreed upon).

However, in some use-case scenarios the user may require that both peers authenticate each other. This is referred to as mutual authentication or client authentication. If the project requires client authentication there is an additional set of key material that must be used to support it as described in the next section.

Client authentication is also done inherently in Pre-shared Key cipher suites, as both sides of a connection must have a common shared secret.

2.4 Authentication and Key Exchange

2.4.1 Server and Client Authentication

With a cipher suite and authentication mode chosen, the user will need to obtain or generate the necessary key material for supporting the authentication and key exchange mechanisms. X.509 is the standard for how key material is stored in certificate files.

The peer that is being authenticated must have a private key and a public certificate. The peer performing the authentication must have the Certificate Authority (CA) certificate that was used to issue the public certificate. In the standard one-way authentication scenario this means the server will load a private key and certificate while the client will load the CA file.


If client authentication is needed the mirror image of CA, certificate, and private key files must also be used. This chart shows which files clients and server must load when using a standard RSA based cipher suite such as `SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA`.

Authentication Mode	Server Key Files	Client Key Files
One-way server authentication	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. RSA server certificate file 2. RSA private key file for the server certificate file 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Certificate Authority certificate file that issued the server certificate
Additions for client authentication	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Certificate Authority certificate file that issued the client certificate 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. RSA client certificate file 3. RSA private key file for the client certificate file


2.4.2 Certificate Validation and Authentication

Authentication in SSL is most often based on X.509 Certificate chain validation.

Example list of trusted root certificates loaded by a MatrixSSL client with `matrixSslLoadRsaKeys`.
<https://www.geotrust.com/resources/root-certificates/>



Certificate chain sent to a MatrixSSL client during SSL handshake Certificate message by remote server `www.google.com`.



Checks that are done on all certificates:

X.509 Field	New in 3.6	Validation Performed
Version	New	Must be a version 3 certificate. Prior to 3.6, all certificate versions were accepted.
Serial		Used for lookup in a CRL, if USE_CRL defined.
Signature Algorithm		RSA or ECDSA algorithms. Must be SHA-1 or SHA-2 based hash. MD2 and MD5 support for RSA signatures is supported only with custom compile options.
Issuer		In a chain, issuer must match the subject of the immediate (following) parent certificate. Self-signed certificates (Issuer == Subject) are allowed as loaded root certificates, but not as part of a chain. Common name must contain only printable characters.
Validity	Change	Current date must be within notBefore and notAfter range on all certs in the chain. Time is not currently validated. On platforms without a date function, the range check is always flagged as failed and must be handled by the Certificate Validation Callback. Prior to 3.6, example validation only within the Certificate Validation Callback.
Subject	New	Common name must contain only printable characters. Common name will be validated via full match to expectedName, if provided in matrixSslNewClientSession(). Partial match not allowed. Wildcard match is allowed for the first segment of a DNS name. Prior to 3.6, subject validation needed to be done within the Certificate Validation Callback.
Subject Public Key Info		RSA and ECC keys supported. RSA public key modulus must be at least MIN_RSA_SIZE bits. ECC public key must be at least MIN_ECC_SIZE bits.
Signature		The hash of the certificate contents must match the hash that is signed by the Issuer Public Key.
Basic Constraints	Change	For Root or intermediate certs, must be marked Critical with CA:TRUE. Path Length constraints are validated. Prior to 3.6, only CA flag was checked, not path length.
Key Usage	New	For Root or intermediate certs, must be marked for use as CertificateSign. For CRL checks, CrISign flag must be set. Prior to 3.6, Key Usage was not enforced.
Extended Key Usage	New	If marked Critical, must have "TLS Web Server Authentication" or "TLS Web Client Authentication" set in the leaf certificate. Prior to 3.6, this extension was not enforced.
Subject Alternative Name	New	If an expectedName is specified in matrixSslNewClientSession() and does not match Subject Common Name, or any printable Subject Alternative Name of type DNS, Email or IP, validation will fail. Prior to 3.6, alt subject validation needed to be done within the Certificate Validation Callback.
Authority Key Identifier	New	If specified, the direct Issuer of the certificate must have a defined, matching Subject Key Identifier. Prior to 3.6 this field was ignored.
Subject Key Identifier	New	If specified, any direct children of the Issuer must have a defined, matching Authority Key Identifier. Prior to 3.6 this field was ignored.
CRL Distribution Points		If USE_CRL is defined, matrixSslGetCRL() will download the CRL files from each URI type distribution point provided for each trusted root certificate (Note: not intermediate certificates).
CRL Validation		CRL file must be signed by certificate with CrISign Basic constraints. MD5 signatures not supported by default.
Unknown Extensions	Change	Unknown extensions are ignored, unless flagged as Critical. Validation will fail for any Critical extension unrecognized by MatrixSSL. Prior to 3.6, unknown critical extensions were warned, but allowed.

For information on how to create Certificate Authority root and child certificates please see the [Matrix Key and Cert Generation Utilities](#) document.

3 APPLICATION INTEGRATION FLOW

MatrixSSL is a C code library that provides a security layer for client and server applications allowing them to securely communicate with other SSL enabled peers. MatrixSSL is transport agnostic and can just as easily integrate with an HTTP server as it could with a device communicating through a serial port. For simplicity, this developer's guide will assume a socket-based implementation for all its examples unless otherwise noted.

The term *application* in this document refers to the peer (client or server) application the MatrixSSL library is being integrated into.

This section will detail the specific points in the application life cycle where MatrixSSL should be integrated. In general, MatrixSSL APIs are used for initialization/cleanup, when new secure connections are being established (handshaking), and when encrypting/decrypting messages exchanged with peers.

Refer to the [MatrixSSL API](#) document to get familiar with the interface to the library and with the example code to see how they are used at implementation. Follow the guidelines below when using these APIs to integrate MatrixSSL into an application.

3.1 ssl_t Structure

The `ssl_t` structure holds the state and keys for each client or server connection as well as buffers for encoding and decoding SSL data. The buffers are dynamically managed internally to make the integration with existing non-secure software easier. SSL is a record based protocol, and the internal buffer management makes a better "impedance match" with classic stream based protocols. For example, data may be read from a socket, but if a full SSL record has not been received, no data is available for the caller to process. This partial record is held within the `ssl_t` buffer. The MatrixSSL API is also designed so there are no buffer copies, and the caller is able to read and write network data directly into the SSL buffers, providing a very low memory overhead per session.

3.2 Initialization

MatrixSSL must be initialized as part of the application initialization with a call to `matrixSslOpen`. This function takes the constant parameter `MATRIXSSL_CONFIG` and sets up the internal structures needed by the library.

In most cases, the application will subsequently load the key material from the file system. RSA or EC certificates, Diffie-Hellman parameters, and Pre-Shared Keys for the specific peer application must be parsed before creating a new SSL session. The `matrixSslNewKeys` function is used to allocate the key storage and `matrixSslLoadRsaKeys`, `matrixSslLoadEcKeys`, `matrixSslLoadDhParams`, and `matrixSslLoadPsk` are used to parse the key material into the `sslKeys_t` structure during initialization. The populated key structure will be used as an input parameter to `matrixSslNewClientSession` or `matrixSslNewServerSession`.

The allocation and loading of the `sslKeys_t` structure is most commonly done a single time at start and the application uses those keys for each connection. Alternatively, a new `sslKeys_t` structure can be allocated once for each secure connection and freed immediately after the connection is closed. This should be done if the application has multiple certificate files depending on the identity of the connecting entity or if there is a security concern with keeping the RSA keys in memory for extended periods of time.

Once the application is done with the keys, the associated memory is freed with a call to `matrixSslDeleteKeys`.

3.3 Creating a Session

The next MatrixSSL integration point in the application is when a new session is starting. In the case of a client, this is whenever it chooses to begin one because SSL is a client-initiated protocol (like HTTP). In the case of a server, a new session should be started when the server accepts an incoming connection from a client on a secure port. In a socket based application, this would typically happen when the accept socket call returns with a valid incoming socket. The application sets up a new session with the API `matrixSslNewClientSession` or `matrixSslNewServerSession`. The returned `ssl_t` context will become the input parameter for all public APIs that act at a per-session level.

The required input parameters to the session creation APIs differ based on whether the application is assuming a server or client role. Both require a populated keys structure (discussed in the previous section) but a client can also nominate a specific cipher suite or session ID when starting a session. The ciphers that the server will accept are determined at compile time.

The client should also always nominate a certificate callback function during `matrixSslNewClientSession`. This callback function will be invoked mid-handshake to allow the user to inspect the key material, date and other certificate information sent from the server. For detailed information on this callback function, see the API documentation for The Certificate Validation Callback Function section.

The server may also choose to nominate a certificate callback function if client authentication is desired. The MatrixSSL library must have been compiled with `USE_CLIENT_AUTH` defined in order to use this parameter in the `matrixSslNewServerSession` function.

For clients wishing to quickly (and securely) reconnect to a server that it has recently connected to, there is an optional `sessionId` parameter that may be used to initiate a faster resumed handshake (the CPU intensive public key exchange is omitted). To use the session parameter, a client should allocate a `sslSessionId_t` structure with `matrixSslNewSessionId` and pass it to `matrixSslNewClientSession` during the initial connection with the server. Over the course of the session negotiation, the MatrixSSL library will populate that structure behind-the-scenes so that during the next connection the same `sessionId` parameter address can be used to initiate the resumed session.

3.4 Handshaking

During client session initialization with `matrixSslNewClientSession` the SSL handshake message `CLIENT_HELLO` is encoded to the internal outgoing buffer. The client now needs to send this message to the server over a communication channel.

The sequence of events that should always be used to transmit pending handshake data is as follows:

1. The user calls `matrixSslGetOutdata` to retrieve the encoded data and number of bytes to be sent
2. The user sends the number of bytes indicated from the out data buffer pointer to the peer
3. The user calls `matrixSslSentData` with the actual number of bytes that were sent
4. If more data remains (bytes sent < bytes to be sent), repeat the above 3 steps when the transport layer is ready to send again

When the server receives notice that a client is starting a new session the `matrixSslNewServerSession` API is invoked and the incoming data is retrieved and processed.

The sequence of events that should always be used when expecting handshake data from a peer is as follows:

1. The application calls `matrixSslGetReadbuf` to retrieve a pointer to available buffer space in the `ssl_t` structure.
2. The application reads (or copies) incoming data into that buffer
3. The application calls `matrixSslReceivedData` to process the data
4. The application examines the return code from `matrixSslReceivedData` to determine the next step

All incoming messages should be copied into the provided buffer and passed to `matrixSslReceivedData`, which processes the message and drives the handshake through the built-in SSLv3 or TLS state machine. The parameters include the SSL context and the number of bytes that have been received. The return code from `matrixSslReceivedData` tells the application what the message was and how it is to be handled:

MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_SEND	Success. The processing of the received data resulted in an SSL response message that needs to be sent to the peer. If this return code is hit the user should call <code>matrixSslGetOutdata</code> to retrieve the encoded outgoing data.
MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_RECV	Success. More data must be received and this function must be called again. User must first call <code>matrixSslGetReadbuf</code> again to receive the updated buffer pointer and length to where the remaining data should be read into.
MATRIXSSL_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE	Success. The SSL handshake is complete. This return code is returned to client side implementation during a full handshake after parsing the FINISHED message from the server. It is possible for a server to receive this value if a resumed handshake is being performed where the client sends the final FINISHED message.
MATRIXSSL_RECEIVED_ALERT	Success. The data that was processed was an SSL alert message. In this case, the <code>ptbuf</code> pointer will be two bytes (<code>ptLen</code> will be 2) in which the first byte will be the alert level and the second byte will be the alert description. After examining the alert, the user must call <code>matrixSslProcessedData</code> to indicate the alert was processed and the data may be internally discarded.
MATRIXSSL_APP_DATA	Success. The data that was processed was application data that the user should process. In this return code case the <code>ptbuf</code> and <code>ptLen</code> output parameters will be valid. The user may process the data directly from <code>ptbuf</code> or copy it aside for later processing. After handling the data the user must call <code>matrixSslProcessedData</code> to indicate the plain text data may be internally discarded.
PS_SUCCESS	Success. This return code will be returned if the bytes parameter is 0 and there is no remaining internal data to process. This could be useful as a polling mechanism to confirm the internal buffer is empty. One real life use-case for this method of invocation is when dealing with a Google Chrome browser that uses False Start.
< 0	Failure. See API documentation

3.5 Communicating Securely With Peers

3.5.1 Encrypting Data

Once the handshake is complete, the application wishing to encrypt data that will be sent to the peer has the choice between two encoding options.

In-Situ Encryption

An in-situ encryption occurs when the outputted cipher text overwrites the plain text during the encoding process. In this case, the user will retrieve an allocated buffer from the MatrixSSL library, populate the buffer with the desired plaintext, and then notify the library that the plaintext is ready to be encoded. The API steps for the in-situ method are as follows:

1. The application first determines the length of the plaintext that needs to be sent
2. The application calls `matrixSslGetWritebuf` with that length to retrieve a pointer to an internally allocated buffer.
3. The application writes the plaintext into the buffer and then calls `matrixSslEncodeWritebuf` to encrypt the plaintext
4. The application calls `matrixSslGetOutdata` to retrieve the encoded data and length to be sent (SSL always adds some overhead to the message size)
5. The application sends the out data buffer contents to the peer.
6. The application calls `matrixSslSentData` with the number of bytes that were actually sent

User provided plaintext data location

The alternative to in-situ encryption is to allow the user to provide the location and length of the plaintext data that needs to be encoded. In this case, the encrypted data is still written to the internal MatrixSSL outdata buffer but the user provided plaintext data is left untouched. The API steps for this method are as follows:

1. The user passes the plaintext and length to `matrixSslEncodeToOutdata`
2. The application calls `matrixSslGetOutdata` to retrieve the encoded data and length to be sent (SSL always adds some overhead to the message size)
3. The application sends the out data buffer contents to the peer.
4. The application calls `matrixSslSentData` with the # of bytes that were actually sent

3.5.2 Decrypting Data

The sequence of events that should always be used when expecting application data from a peer is as follows:

1. The application calls `matrixSslGetReadbuf` to retrieve an allocated buffer
2. The application copies the incoming data into that buffer
3. The application calls `matrixSslReceivedData` to process the data
4. The application confirms the return code from `matrixSslReceivedData` is `MATRIXSSL_APP_DATA` and parses `ptLen` bytes of the returned plain text
5. If the return code does not indicate application data, handle the return code as described in the handshaking section above.
6. The application calls `matrixSslProcessedData` to inform the library it is finished with the plaintext and checks to see if there are additional records in the buffer to process.

3.6 Ending a Session

When the application receives notice that the session is complete or has determined itself that the session is complete, it should notify the other side, close the socket and delete the session. Calling `matrixSslEncodeClosureAlert` and `matrixSslDeleteSession` will perform this step.

A call to `matrixSslEncodeClosureAlert` is an optional step that will encode an alert message to pass along to the other side to inform them to close the session cleanly. The closure alert buffer is retrieved and sent using the same `matrixSslGetOutdata` then `matrixSslSentData` mechanism that all outgoing data uses. Since the connection is being closed, the application shouldn't block indefinitely on sending the closure alert.

3.7 Closing the Library

At application exit the MatrixSSL library should be un-initialized with a call to `matrixSslClose`. If the application has called `matrixSsNewKeys` as part of the initialization process and kept its keys in memory it should call `matrixSslDeleteKeys` before calling `matrixSslClose`. Also, any existing SSL sessions should be freed by calling `matrixSslDeleteSession` before calling `matrixSslClose`.

Working implementations of MatrixSSL client and server applications integration can be found in the apps subdirectory of the distribution package.

4 CONFIGURABLE FEATURES

MatrixSSL contains a set of optional features that are configurable at compile time. This allows the user to remove unneeded functionality to reduce code size footprint. Each of these options are pre-processor defines that can be disabled by simply commenting out the `#define` in the header files or by using the `-D` compile flag during build. APIs with dependencies on optional features are highlighted in the Define Dependencies sub-section in the API documentation for that function.

4.1 Protocol and Performance

asdf

MATRIX_USE_FILE_SYSTEM	Define in the build environment. Enables file access for parsing X.509 certificates and private keys.
USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Enables client side SSL support
USE_SERVER_SIDE_SSL	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Enables server side SSL support
USE_TLS	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Enables TLS 1.0 protocol support (SSL version 3.1)
USE_TLS_1_1	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Enables TLS 1.1 (SSL version 3.2) protocol support. USE_TLS must be enabled
USE_TLS_1_2	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Enables TLS 1.2 (SSL version 3.3) protocol support. USE_TLS_1_1 must be enabled
DISABLE_SSLV3	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Disables SSL version 3.0
DISABLE_TLS_1_0	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Disables TLS 1.0 if USE_TLS is enabled but only later versions of the protocol are desired
DISABLE_TLS_1_1	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Disables TLS 1.1 if USE_TLS_1_1 is enabled but only later versions of the protocol are desired
SSL_SESSION_TABLE_SIZE	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Applicable to servers only. The size of the session resumption table for caching session identifiers. Old entries will be overwritten when size is reached
SSL_SESSION_ENTRY_LIFE	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Applicable to servers only. The time in seconds that a session identifier will be valid in the session table. A value of 0 will disable SSL resumption
USE_STATELESS_SESSION_TICKETS	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Enable stateless session tickets as defined in RFC 5077
ENABLE_SECURE_REHANDSHAKES	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Enable secure rehandshaking as defined in RFC 5746
REQUIRE_SECURE_REHANDSHAKES	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Halt communications with any SSL peer that has not implemented RFC 5746
ENABLE_INSECURE_REHANDSHAKES	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Enable legacy renegotiations. NOT RECOMMENDED
REQUESTED_MAX_PLAINTEXT_RECORD_LEN	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Enable the "max_fragment_length" TLS extension defined in RFC 4366. Value of #define determines fragment length (server may reject)
ENABLE_FALSE_START	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - See code comments in file
USE_BEAST_WORKAROUND	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - See code comments in file.
USE_CLIENT_AUTH	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Enables two-way(mutual) authentication
SERVER_CAN_SEND_EMPTY_CERT_REQUEST	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - A client authentication feature. Allows the server to send an empty CertificateRequest message if no CA files have been loaded
SERVER_WILL_ACCEPT_EMPTY_CLIENT_CERT_MSG	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - A client authentication feature. Allows the server to 'downgrade' a client authentication handshake to a standard handshake if client does not provide a certificate
USE_ZLIB_COMPRESSION	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Enables handshake support for zlib compression. See the section for zlib compression in this document for more information.

USE_TRUNCATED_HMAC	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> – Enabled the truncated hmac TLS extension from RFC 6066
USE_PRIVATE_KEY_PARSING	<i>cryptoConfig.h</i> - Enables X.509 private key parsing
USE_PKCS5	<i>cryptoConfig.h</i> - Enables the parsing of password protected private keys
USE_PKCS8	<i>cryptoConfig.h</i> - Enables the parsing of PKCS#8 formatted private keys
USE_PKCS12	<i>cryptoConfig.h</i> - Enables the parsing of PKCS#12 formatted certificate and key material
USE_1024_KEY_SPEED_OPTIMIZATIONS	<i>cryptoConfig.h</i> - Enables fast math for 1024-bit public key operations
PS_PUBKEY_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SMALLER_RAM PS_PUBKEY_OPTIMIZE_FOR_FASTER_SPEED	<i>cryptoConfig.h</i> - RSA and Diffie-Hellman speed vs. runtime memory tradeoff. Default is to optimize for smaller RAM.
PS_AES_IMPROVE_PERF_INCREASE_CODESIZE PS_3DES_IMPROVE_PERF_INCREASE_CODESIZE PS_MD5_IMPROVE_PERF_INCREASE_CODESIZE PS_SHA1_IMPROVE_PERF_INCREASE_CODESIZE	<i>cryptoConfig.h</i> - Optionally enable for selected algorithms to improve performance at the cost of increased binary code size.
ENABLE_MD5_SIGNED_CERTS	<i>cryptoConfig.h</i> – Support MD5 signature algorithm in X.509 certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists.
MIN_RSA_SIZE MIN_DH_SIZE MIN_ECC_SIZE	<i>cryptoConfig.h</i> – The minimum size in bits that MatrixSSL will accept for key exchange for each algorithm. Prevents weak keys from being used or downgraded to.

4.2 Public Key Math Assembly Optimizations

Optimizing assembly code for low level math operations is available for many common processor architectures. The files *pstm_montgomery_reduce.c*, *pstm_mul_comba.c*, and *pstm_sqr_comba.c* in the *crypto/math* directory implement the available assembly optimizations. These following defines must be set in the build environment. As an example, the provided top level *Makefile* includes support for popular Linux and MacOS x86 platforms.

PSTM_X86	32-bit x86 processor
PSTM_X86_64	64-bit x86 processor
PSTM_ARM	ARMv4 processor
PSTM_MIPS	32-bit MIPS processor
<none of the above>	Standard C code implementation

4.3 Debug Configuration

MatrixSSL contains a set of optional debug features that are configurable at compile time. Each of these options are pre-processor defines that can be disabled by simply commenting out the `#define` in the specified header files.


HALT_ON_PS_ERROR	<i>coreConfig.h</i> - Enables the <code>osdepBreak</code> platform function whenever a <code>psError</code> trace function is called. Helpful in debug environments.
USE_CORE_TRACE	<i>coreConfig.h</i> - Enables the <code>psTraceCore</code> family of APIs that display function-level messages in the core module
USE_CRYPT0_TRACE	<i>cryptoConfig.h</i> - Enables the <code>psTraceCrypto</code> family of APIs that display function-level messages in the crypto module
USE_SSL_HANDSHAKE_MSG_TRACE	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Enables SSL handshake level debug trace for troubleshooting connection problems
USE_SSL_INFORMATIONAL_TRACE	<i>matrixsslConfig.h</i> - Enables SSL function level debug trace for troubleshooting connection problems

5 SSL HANDSHAKING

The core of SSL security is the handshake protocol that allows two peers to authenticate and negotiate symmetric encryption keys. A handshake is defined by the specific sequence of SSL messages that are exchanged between the client and server. A collection of messages being sent from one peer to another is called a flight.

5.1 Standard Handshake

The standard handshake is the most common and allows a client to authenticate a server. There are four flights in the standard handshake.



Client Notes

The client is the first to send and the last to receive. Therefore, a MatrixSSL implementation of a client must be testing for the `MATRIXSSL_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE` return code from `matrixSslReceivedData` to determine when application data is ready to be encrypted and sent to the server.

When a client wishes to begin a standard handshake, `matrixSslNewClientSession` will be called with an empty `sessionId`.

5.2 Client Authentication

The client authentication handshake allows a two-way authentication. There are four flights in the client authentication handshake.



```

----- CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ----->
----- FINISHED ----->

<----- CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -----
<----- FINISHED -----

```

Client Notes

The client is the first to send and the last to receive. Therefore, a MatrixSSL implementation of a client must be testing for the `MATRIXSSL_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE` return code from `matrixSslReceivedData` to determine when application data is ready to be encrypted and sent to the server.

In order to participate in a client authentication handshake, the client must have loaded a Certificate Authority file during the call to `matrixSslLoadRsaKeys`.

Server Notes

To prepare for a client authentication handshake the server must nominate a certificate and private key during the call to `matrixSslLoadRsaKeys`. The actual determination of whether or not to perform a client authentication handshake is made when nominating a certificate callback parameter when invoking `matrixSslNewServerSession`. If the callback is provided, a client authentication handshake will be requested.

5.3 Session Resumption

Session resumption enables a previously connected client to quickly resume a session with a server. Session resumption is much faster than other handshake types because public key authentication is not performed (authentication is implicit since both sides will be using secret information from the previous connection). This handshake types has three flights.

```

CLIENT                                SERVER
----- CLIENT_HELLO ----->

<----- SERVER_HELLO -----
<----- CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -----
<----- FINISHED -----

----- CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ----->
----- FINISHED ----->

```

Client Notes

The client is the first and the last to send data. Therefore, a MatrixSSL implementation of a client must be testing for the `MATRIXSSL_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE` return code from `matrixSslSentData` to determine when application data is ready to be encrypted and sent to the server.

The client initiates a session resumption handshake by reusing the same `sessionId_t` structure from a previously connected session when calling `matrixSslNewClientSession`.

Server Notes

The MatrixSSL server will cache a `SSL_SESSION_TABLE_SIZE` number of session IDs for resumption. The length of time a session ID will remain in the case is determined by `SSL_SESSION_ENTRY_LIFE`.

5.4 Re-Handshakes

A re-handshake is a handshake over a currently connected SSL session. A re-handshake may take the form of a standard handshake, a client authentication handshake, or a resumed handshake. Either the client or server may initiate a re-handshake.

The `matrixSslEncodeRehandshake` API is used to initiate a re-handshake. The three most common reasons for initiating re-handshakes are:

Re-key the symmetric cryptographic material

Re-keying the symmetric keys adds an extra level of security for applications that require the connection be open for long periods of time or transferring large amounts of data. Periodic changes to the keys can discourage hackers who are mounting timing attacks on a connection.

Perform a client authentication handshake

A scenario may arise in which the server requires that the data being exchanged is only allowed for a client whose certificate has been authenticated, but the original negotiation took place without client authentication. In order to do a client authenticated re-handshake the server must call `matrixSslEncodeRehandshake` with a certificate callback parameter.

Change cipher spec

The cipher suite may be changed on a connected session using a re-handshake if needed. The client must call `matrixSslEncodeRehandshake` with the new `cipherSpec`.

5.4.1 Disable Re-Handshaking At Runtime

Global disabling of re-handshakes can be controlled at compile time using the `ENABLE_SECURE_REHANDSHAKES` define but sometimes a per-session control of the feature is required. In these cases, the `matrixSslDisableRehandshakes` and `matrixSslReEnableRehandshakes` APIs are used.

5.4.2 The Re-Handshake Credit Mechanism

The re-handshake feature has been used at the entry point in a couple TLS attacks. In an effort to combat these attacks, MatrixSSL has incorporated a mechanism that prevents a peer from continually re-handshaking. This “re-handshake credit” mechanism is simply a count of how often the MatrixSSL-enabled application will allow a peer to request a re-handshake before sending the `NO_RENEGOTIATION` alert. The default number of credits is set using the `DEFAULT_RH_CREDITS` define in `matrixssl.h`. The shipped default is 1.

In order to allow real-life conditions of re-handshakes, a single credit will be added after transmitting a given number of application data bytes. The default count of bytes that have to be sent before gaining a credit is set using the `BYTES_BEFORE_RH_CREDIT` define in `matrixssl.h`. The shipped default is 20MB.

6 OPTIONAL FEATURES

6.1 Stateless Session Ticket Resumption

RFC 5077 defines an alternative method to the standard server-cached session ID mechanism. The stateless ticket mechanism allows the server to send an encrypted session ticket to the client that the client can use in a later connection to speed up the handshake process. The server does not have to store a large number of session ID entries when this stateless mechanism is used.

The feature is enabled with the `USE_STATELESS_SESSION_TICKETS` define in *matrixsslConfig.h*.

The client only has to use the standard session resumption API, `matrixSslNewSessionId`, to enable the feature. If a server does not support stateless session tickets, the standard resumption mechanism will still work.

The server must load at least one session ticket key using `matrixSslLoadSessionTicketKeys` to enable the feature. A user callback can optionally be registered that will be called each time a session ticket is received from a client. The callback will indicate to the user whether or not the server already has the correct ticket key cached. The callback can be used to locate a ticket key or to void the ticket and revert to a full handshake. The `matrixSslSetSessionTicketCallback` API is used to register this function.

The MatrixSSL implementation for resumption does not renew the session ticket as described in section 3.1 of the RFC (Figure 2). If the ticket is valid, the server progresses with the standard resumed handshake without a `NewSessionTicket` handshake message. If the server is unable to decrypt the session ticket, a full handshake will take place and a new session ticket will be issued. The MatrixSSL library also handles the expiration of a session ticket based on the value of the `SSL_SESSION_ENTRY_LIFE` in *matrixsslConfig.h*.

6.2 MatrixSSL Statistics Framework

Implementations that wish to capture counts of SSL events can tap into the `MATRIXSSL_STATS` framework by enabling `USE_MATRIXSSL_STATS` during the compile. The mechanism is a very simple counter that can be modified to record whatever specific SSL event the user wants. The default set of events capture the following:

- `CLIENT_HELLO` count (sent for clients and received for servers)
- `SERVER_HELLO` count (sent for servers and received for clients)
- Alerts sent
- Resumed handshake count
- Failed resumed handshake count
- Number of application data bytes received
- Number of application data bytes sent

To add an event to the framework the user must:

1. Add a member to the `matrixsslStats_t` data type in *matrixsslLib.h*
2. Add a unique `#define` ID to the list of existing stats in *matrixsslLib.h*
3. Add a handler for the new ID in the `matrixsslUpdateStat` function in *matrixssl.c*
4. Add a handler for the new ID in the `matrixsslGetStat` function in *matrixssl.c*
5. Add the call to `matrixsslUpdateStat` in the appropriate place in the MatrixSSL library

6.3 ZLIB Compression

The TLS specification specifies a mechanism for peers to agree on an algorithm to compress data before being encrypted. Although the feature is not widely adopted and is somewhat discouraged due to the

'CRIME' attack, there is limited support in MatrixSSL for zlib compression for implementations that are sensitive to throughput.

To enable the feature, enable `USE_ZLIB_COMPRESSION` in *matrixsslConfig.h*. It will also be necessary to edit the development environment to link with a zlib library. For a standard GCC POSIX environment this should simply mean including `-lz` in the linker flags.

The Matrix built-in support for this feature is limited. The feature only supports the internal compression and decompression of the FINISHED handshake message for initial handshakes. This means re-handshaking is not supported and that the application MUST compress and decompress application data manually.

- On the application data sending side:

After a successful handshake with `USE_ZLIB_COMPRESSION` enabled, the user should call `matrixSslIsSessionCompressionOn` to test whether that mode has been successfully negotiated. If `PS_TRUE`, the user must manually zlib deflate any application data before calling the Matrix encryption functions. Do not compress more plaintext data in a single record than the maximum allowed record size to remain compatible with 3rd party SSL implementations.

- On the application data receiving side:

Applications must test for `MATRIXSSL_APP_DATA_COMPRESSED` as the return code from `matrixSslReceivedData`. If found, the data must be zlib inflated to obtain the plaintext data